Aesthetic Capitalism offers an innovative analysis of contemporary capitalism and its use of image, symbolism, creativity and other aesthetic elements to produce economic value.

This collection brings together philosophers, sociologists, musicologists and students of culture who theorize music through cultural practices as diverse as opera and classical music, jazz and pop, avant-garde and DIY musical cultures, music festivals and isolated listening through the iPod, rock in urban heritage and the piano in East Asia.

The article is an evaluation of the economic, organizational and social theory of Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism 15 years after its publication. The role of network capitalism, state capitalism, and aesthetic capitalism in French social life is analysed. The article concludes that flexible network capitalism was largely a chimera of the 1990s and that French political and economic life today is dominated by an ailing state capitalism.

Recent studies in social endocrinology have explored the effects of social relationships on female reproductive steroid hormones—estradiol and progesterone—investigating whether they are suppressed in partnered and parous women. Results have been mixed for these hormones although evidence is more consistent that partnered women and women with young children have lower levels of testosterone. These studies were sequential to earlier research on men, based on Wingfield’s Challenge Hypothesis, which showed that men in committed relationships, or with young children, have lower levels (...) of testosterone than unpartnered men or men with older or no children. The study described here explored associations between estradiol and progesterone with partnership and parity among women from two different ethnicities: South Asian and white British. We hypothesized that both steroid hormones would be lower among partnered and/or parous women with children ≤3 years old, regardless of ethnicity. In this study we analyzed data from 320 Bangladeshi and British women of European origin aged 18 to 50 who participated in two previous studies of reproductive ecology and health. Levels of estradiol and progesterone were assayed using saliva and/or serum samples and the body mass index calculated from anthropometric data. Questionnaires provided other covariates. Multiple linear regressions were used to analyze the data. The hypotheses were not supported. We argue here that, unlike links between testosterone and male social relationships, theoretical foundations for such relationships with female reproductive steroid hormones are lacking, especially given the primary role of these steroids in regulating female reproductive function. Further longitudinal studies are needed to explore the bases of independent relationships between social factors and female reproductive steroid hormones. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“Violence Is Not an Evil”Ambiguity and Violence in Simone de Beauvoir’s Early Philosophical WritingsAnn V. MurphyThe recent translation and compilation of several of Simone de Beauvoir’s philosophical essays from the 1940s shed new light on Beauvoir’s understanding of the relationship between ethics and violence. While these essays predate the publication of The Second Sex (1949) and do not concern themselves with the subject of feminism per se, Beauvoir’s philosophy (...) of violence as it is outlined in both “Pyrrhus and Cineas” (1944) and “An Eye for an Eye” (1948) speaks to one of the more thoroughgoing concerns in contemporary feminist philosophy; namely, the nature of the relation between corporeal vulnerability, violence, and ethics. Together with The Ethics of Ambiguity (1948), these early essays probe the difficulties in moving from an ontology in which violence appears to be inexorable to the terrain of ethical prescription. This essay urges recognition of the continuing relevance of Beauvoir’s philosophy in relation to the renaissance of interest in the theme of vulnerability in contemporary feminist theory. I argue that Beauvoir’s philosophy provides one of the most sophisticated accounts to date of the ethical problems posed by the experiential ambiguities of violence, and that her legacy in this regard is as important and redemptive as ever. More precisely, I read Beauvoir’s early conception of ambiguity as the philosophical predecessor to contemporary deconstructive accounts of corporeal vulnerability.Discourse on the body has governed the evolution of feminist philosophy. Recently, however, the nature of the body under investigation has changed. Whereas previously the critique of the nature/culture distinction dominated [End Page 29] feminist debates regarding the social construction of sex and gender, recent feminist work has consolidated around another conceptual pairing; namely, vulnerability and aggression. In reference to Beauvoir’s philosophical corpus, this recent development is interesting. Her magnum opus, The Second Sex, has attracted more attention because of its centrality in the debates over the social construction of sex and gender, a debate that has dominated feminist philosophy for the last several decades. Indeed, many laud this text for being ahead of its time with regard to the acknowledgement that “one is not born a woman,” but rather becomes one. This essay argues that Beauvoir’s early texts are similarly prescient with regard to the current preoccupation with the philosophical themes of violence and vulnerability. By tracing the development of Beauvoir’s idea of ambiguity, I argue that her conception of the body as the site of both aggression and vulnerability both anticipates and continues to productively address the problem of how one moves from a descriptive ontology to the terrain of ethics. This is a movement that Beauvoir arguably theorized more rigorously than either Maurice Merleau-Ponty or Jean-Paul Sartre, neither of whom published such sustained philosophical work on ethics in his lifetime.1I. Ambiguity in Beauvoir’s Early WorkIn The Ethics of Ambiguity, Beauvoir’s reflections on ethics come from a resolutely secular, existentialist perspective. Beauvoir—like her contemporaries in French existential phenomenology—understood human existence to be essentially marked by failure. Importantly, this failure is not vicious; rather, it is the consequence of the fact that human freedom can only ever be determined in scenes of constraint. Despite her resistance to the universal aspirations of Kant’s ethics, Beauvoir’s understanding of subjectivity as failure is consonant with the Kantian rendering of the ethical agent as a being for whom reason does not infallibly determine the will; indeed, an agent for whom reason is necessarily undone by certain inclinations and contingencies.2 For Kant, it made no sense to speak of the will unless one was referring to a being that had the capacity to act in accord with reason but did not infallibly manage to do so. Hence, ethics is an issue for us precisely to the degree that we are capable of failure. In this sense, ambiguity and failure mark the human condition and our distance from the divine. Only a being whose existence is marked by this inadequacy would ponder right and wrong, would debate the nature of ethical atrocity and recovery, and would anguish over the... (shrink)

The Nordic PhD: Surviving and Succeeding is an edited book written for prospective and current doctoral students by a mix of doctoral students and those who have recently completed their doctorates. The premise is simple: if you could go back in time and talk with yourself when you began your studies, what advice would you give? Isn't hindsight a bonus? If only I knew then what I know now! The Nordic PhD: Surviving and Succeeding follows editions focused on study in (...) Aotearoa New Zealand, Australia, the U.K., U.S., and South Africa. What sets The Nordic PhD: Surviving and Succeeding apart from many others on the market is its down-to-earth and practical approach. Furthermore, its originality also lies in the fact that it is grounded in the context of doctoral studies in the Nordic countries. (shrink)

In honor of William Wainwright, this article takes up his interest in interreligious dialogue. It pursues two goals simultaneously: One is to provide a better model for understanding philosophy of religion. Terrence Tilley claims that there is the standard model which is mistaken in that it takes arguing for religious beliefs to be equivalent to justifying commitment to a religion. He promotes a practical model, which has its ancestry in the writings of Michel de Montaigne and Blaise Pascal. This model (...) begins with the lived practices of religion and justifies its intellectual content as explanation for the rightness of this way of life. Wainwright’s work fits into the practical model, but Tilley provides a description and a stronger basis for it. The second goal is to provide much more adequate epistemological resources than those used by the standard model, with contributions from Catholic modernist theologian George Tyrrell, recent philosopher of science Imre Lakatos, and Alasdair MacIntyre, who became interested in evaluating traditions, in science, in moral reasoning, and finally what he came to call large-scale traditions. The problem he needed to overcome is the fact that such traditions carry their own, often different, concepts of reasoning. The possibility of fruitful rational conversation between religions is illustrated here by an account of dialogue between Christianity and Shi’ia Islam, as exemplified in David Burrell’s ability to use conversation with Islamic thought to clarify for Christians their own doctrines of the Trinity, the mediation of Christ, and original sin. (shrink)

De Lubac’s main contribution to political thought is his belief that human freedom is the quality in human nature with which divine grace resonates. His idea of the relation of grace to nature is best illustrated by Christ’s fulfilment of the Old Testament.

Arthur Caplan has argued that the presumptive naturalness, universality, and inevitability of aging are no obstacles to conceptualizing aging as a disease since those traits are themselves merely contingent. Moreover, aging lends itself to discussion in terms of diagnostic symptomatology and etiology. Is aging therefore a disease? I argue that aging need not be shown to be unnatural or a disease in order to make it the subject of biomedical interest. I suggest that rather than ask "Is aging a disease?", (...) the better point of philosophical departure would be to ask "Is aging objectionable such that its prevention and cure ought to be sought?". In this way, the moral issues at stake emerge more clearly. Chief among these issues are the potential results of curing aging and the implications for the prospect of meaningful human life without the de facto limitations that aging (and perhaps death) put upon it. A convincing argument that aging should be cured, therefore, would need to show that human significance warrants and possibly seeks such a cure and that the social costs of curing aging are morally acceptable. Keywords: aging, disease, cure, immortality CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Air of Liberty:A Transatlantic PerspectiveKieran M. Murphy (bio)"En somme le rôle du critique serait sans cesse de faire de l'air dans le plein du monde mais non pas forcement de faire du vide."—Roland Barthes"Dèyè mòn, gen mòn" ["Behind mountains, there are mountains"]—Haitian proverbThe phrase "I can't breathe" has become a worldwide rallying cry against injustice. Ben Okri deems "I can't breathe" the "mantra of oppression" that should (...) "spark the real change our world so desperately needs." He attributes the phrase's remarkable impact to how it taps into our primal fear of suffocation, encouraging empathy for "seemingly insignificant people." He also brings attention to how, as a slogan, "I can't breathe" subverts institutional racism through poetic means: "Not even William Shakespeare, Walt Whitman, James Baldwin or Toni Morrison at their most eloquent came out with anything as simple in the genius of its truth as: 'I can't breathe.'" This truth is airborne: "'I can't breathe' suddenly equates racism with the deprivation of air, which is what it always was." The chokehold of racism emerged with the transatlantic slave trade and, Okri concludes, has been ever since the prohibition of breathing "freedom."The powerful convergence of poetics and politics in the slogan "I can't breathe" comes from its essential truth: the aerial nature of freedom. More than just a concept or metaphor, freedom is also something you breathe. Freedom is a kind of concept-image that depends on our intimate, life-sustaining relationship with the atmosphere. "I can't breathe" brings attention to this relationship to help redress the failure of our institutions to bestow freedom equally.The aerial nature of freedom is even more apparent in the related slogan "the air of liberty." References to "the air of liberty" occurred frequently during the French Revolution to convey the origin of the "human rights" that have become the bedrock of our democratic institutions. Today, these human rights continue to exert their legal weight for the defense of equality. Yet, when confronted with the evasive mechanism of institutional racism, they keep falling short. This predicament is partly due to [End Page 200] their supposed airtight foundation. "The air of liberty" offers a window to the turbulent time when human rights sprang conspicuously from the atmosphere, that we can reopen to shift the focus from the legal to the aerial origin of freedom. This strategy unleashes historical winds that swept across the Atlantic world, including a critical undercurrent from the Haitian Revolution that prefigured the "I can't breathe" movement and its critique of the white chokehold on freedom. Click for larger view View full resolutionFigure 1.Detail of Jean-Jacques-François Le Barbier, Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, circa 1789 (Source: Wikimedia Commons)The best-known depiction of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (Fig. 1) portrays the origin of liberty in a scene unfolding in the sky. Spreading its light and dissipating the clouds of error, the Enlightenment's eye of reason levitates like an aerostat. Its liberating power illuminates the law symbolized by a winged figure pointing to the tablets below containing the articles proclaiming that "men" are born free and equal. Despite the prominence given to the eye of reason, it is in the atmosphere in which it elevates that we must look for the elemental spring of liberty.References to the aerial nature of liberty most intriguingly surfaced in contemporary debates concerning the universality of the Declaration of the Rights of Man. The revolutionary and abolitionist Jacques Pierre [End Page 201] Brissot characterized the 1791 slave rebellion that ravaged the colony of Saint-Domingue (now Haiti) as a fight for a purer, healthier air. In a speech delivered the same year at the National Assembly, he argued that, following the storming of the Bastille and the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the "atmosphere" of inequality hovering over the plantations of Saint-Domingue had become noxious not only for the enslaved but also for the troops that France might dispatch to restore order in the colony... (shrink)

ABSTRACT Avner de Shalit’s central claim in “Political Philosophy and What People Think” is that political philosophers should take seriously the views of the public, but in practice philosophers do not do this. Moreover, philosophers lack adequate justifications for this lack of consideration. In my commentary, I first discuss de Shalit’s rebuttal of arguments that claim political philosophy searches for the truth and the truth is not empirical, which overlooks, in my view, a central debate among contemporary political philosophers as (...) to whether theorizing about principles of justice ought to be based on a consideration of empirical facts. I then articulate what I see as critical impediments to analytically trained political philosophers realizing the contributions to politics that de Shalit envisions, specifically in the form of identifying and constructively critiquing actual injustice. Finally, I suggest that even if the methodology of political philosophy is sufficiently revised to overcome methodological and training limitations, the notion of public will need to be complicated and the scope of critical examination expanded beyond the explicit arguments in favor of or against particular policies. (shrink)

The development of the curriculum for engineering education (course requirements as well as extra-curricular activities like study abroad and internships) should be based on a comprehensive understanding of engineers’ responsibilities. The responsibilities that are constitutive of being an engineer include striving to fulfill the standards of excellence set by technical codes; to improve the idealized models that engineers use to predict, for example, the behavior of alternative designs; and to achieve the internal goods such as safety and sustainability as they (...) are reflected in the design codes. Globalization has implications for these responsibilities and, in turn, for engineering education, by, for example, modifying the collection of possible solutions recognized for existing problems. In addition, international internships can play an important role in fostering the requisite moral imagination of engineering students. (shrink)

De Haan has provided a novel and distinctly enactivist solution to the problem of integrating the physiological, experiential, social and existential. We admire her articulation of her fourth "existential" dimension. Not only does it represent a real attempt to bridge, as she says, enactivism's explanatory gap, it is also a potentially useful construct for conceptualizing the way that self-reflexivity seems to go astray in much psychopathology. We think that pinpointing this phenomenon is something that phenomenological accounts excel at. We have, (...) however, two key reservations about her account, which we outline.To begin with, we are unsure that there is any particular scientific research program that derives from... (shrink)

Most studies of Aristotle's Rhetoric center on the text itself, either dwelling entirely on the text or citing other Aristotelian works only to support a particular interpretation. However, since it is clear that most of Aristotle's works relate to each other as part of a systematic effort to describe the universe, it seems best to look at the Rhetoric in light of his whole range of work. This essay therefore discusses his "metarhetoric", or the whole range of knowledges necessary to (...) be rhetorical. The essay concludes with five examples of what can be learned about the Rhetoric from even a short treatise like his On memory and Reminiscence. (shrink)

Le devenir des religieuses, lors de la Révolution française, est encore mal connu. L’historiographie, lorsqu’elle les aborde, insiste sur leurs complaisances supposées à l’égard des prêtres réfractaires et les montre volontiers en victimes de la Terreur (exemple des Carmélites de Compiègne). Ces éclairages successifs masquent la majorité des ex-religieuses qui s’adaptent et consentent à la sécularisation. Dans le cas étudié (le diocèse de Poitiers) les religieuses qui souhaitent le rester, souvent au risque de leur vie, sont une minorité. Le regard (...) porté sur ces femmes, prises dans le tourbillon de la Révolution, demeure trop attaché à leur voile. Il convient de lever celui-ci pour analyser, de plus près, les bouleversements provoqués par l’événement révolutionnaire, dans les trajectoires collectives et individuelles de ces religieuses. (shrink)

We are living in an algorithmic age where mathematics and computer science are coming together in powerful new ways to influence, shape and guide our behaviour and the governance of our societies. As these algorithmic governance structures proliferate, it is vital that we ensure their effectiveness and legitimacy. That is, we need to ensure that they are an effective means for achieving a legitimate policy goal that are also procedurally fair, open and unbiased. But how can we ensure that algorithmic (...) governance structures are both? This article shares the results of a collective intelligence workshop that addressed exactly this question. The workshop brought together a multidisciplinary group of scholars to consider barriers to legitimate and effective algorithmic governance and the research methods needed to address the nature and impact of specific barriers. An interactive management workshop technique was used to harness the collective intelligence of this multidisciplinary group. This method enabled participants to produce a framework and research agenda for those who are concerned about algorithmic governance. We outline this research agenda below, providing a detailed map of key research themes, questions and methods that our workshop felt ought to be pursued. This builds upon existing work on research agendas for critical algorithm studies in a unique way through the method of collective intelligence. (shrink)

We often impute responsibility to others for the purpose of retributive punishment - sometimes hoping that they receive the level of suffering proportional to what Kant calls their "inner wickedness". But do we know enough to do this without reckless error? Are we morally pure enough to do this without hypocrisy? The present essay explores these two questions. Oftmals rechnen wir anderen Verantwortlichkeit zu, um durch Strafe Vergeltung zu üben - und dies manchmal in der Hoffnung, daß ihnen gerade der (...) Grad an Leid zugefügt wird, der im rechten Verhältnis zu dem steht, was Kant "innere Bösartigkeit" nennt. Aber wissen wir eigentlich genug, um dies ohne grobe Fahrlässigkeit, und sind wir moralisch rein genug, um dies ohne Heuchelei tun zu können? Der vorliegende Beitrag befaßt sich mit diesen beiden Fragen. (shrink)

The study of the circulation of literary texts in ancient Rome has taken on new significance lately. Recent work on Roman books and their readers has emphasized the difference between the dissemination of texts in the ancient world and publication as we moderns know it, and we have come to see that our understanding of Roman culture and their politics can benefit from a closer examination of how the Romans composed, recited, and released their books. Take, for example, Cicero and (...) the readers of his philosophical works. In the Tusculans, the Academica, De Officiis, De Divinatione, and De Finibns Cicero promoted Latin, in terms very like those of modern linguistic nationalism, as a medium for intellectual discourse at the expense of Greek, and exhorted his readers to follow him in transferring philosophy from Greece to Rome. To choose to write philosophy at this time in Latin instead of Greek was, as Cicero put it, a practical means of increasing Rome's intellectual prestige, a campaign in which he invited his readers to enlist. But to whom was this appeal directed? Who, to Cicero's mind at least, would have been useful in achieving this political goal? From evidence in Cicero's letters to Atticus, we can largely retrace how he disseminated these philosophical books, reconstruct to some degree their original readers, and, most importantly, deduce the grounds on which Cicero selected them. Cicero's choice of audience, and the manner in which he assembled it, throws an interesting light both on his agenda in promoting Latin as a philosophical language as well as on the Roman culture of publication. (shrink)

Les prostituées n’échappent pas à la répression et à l’enfermement généralisés organisés par la Monarchie Absolue à la fin du XVIIe siècle. Des institutions nommées « Dames Blanches », « Bon Pasteur » ou « Pénitentes » apparaissent dans la plupart des capitales diocésaines. Afin de ramener ces femmes sur le chemin de la vertu, les autorités font rapidement appel à des religieuses pour diriger ces communautés. Le fonctionnement de deux de ces « couvents », ceux, ceux de Poitiers et (...) La Rochelle, au « siècle des Lumières » est ici étudié. (shrink)

A study of the nature of philosophical reason, architecture, and politics as they are shaped by the influence of port cities and by the eternally returning movement of entry and exit through those cities. The examples of Piraeus, Venice, Rome, Marseilles, Königsberg and New York are considered.

Le positivisme, de Comte à Carnap, a marqué une étape dans le développement d’une science spéciale en dehors des sujets traités jusque là par la philosophie. Cette communication montre que la « syntaxe logique » de Carnap comme la « synthèse subjective » de Comte est un hybride, — une tranche de la philosophie en train de devenir science, et essayant, à l’étape intermédiaire de son processus, d’être à la fois science et philosophie.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LANGUAGE, COMMUNICATION, AND REPRESENTATION IN THE SEMIOTIC OF JOHN POINSOT1 }AMES BERNARD MURPHY Dartmouth College Hanover, New Hampshire 1) Language and the Semiotic of John Poinsot HE SEMIOTIC of John Poinsot is to the study of gns what physics is to the study of nature. Physics is oth the most fundamental and the most general science of nature. All natural processes, from the motion of planets to the (...) division of cells, are governed by, but not only by, laws of physics. Similarly, the semiotic of John Poinsot (traditionally known by his Dominican name, John of St. Thomas) is the most fundamental and general science of signs. The actions of all signs -from natural signs such as footprints and symptoms of disease, to signs of communication, such as logical operators and linguistic signs, to signs in cognition, such as concepts and percepts -are governed by, but not only by, the fundamental relational logic of semiosis set forth in his Ars Logica [1632]. If C. S. Peirce can be said to give us a chemistry of sixty-six signcompounds, John Poinsot, suitably revised, gives us the basic physical laws of motion that bring sign, object, and mind into relation.2 i The author would like to acknowledge gratefully the fellowships received from the American Council of Learned Societies and from Dartmouth College supporting the research of this article. I also wish to acknowledge the help of my research assistant, Daniel Glazer, in hunting down many essential books and articles. John Deely assisted by correcting my discussion of some of the finer points of Poinsot's theory as well as by providing many other helpful suggestions for revision. 2 The first modern author to point this out was Jacques Maritain, especially in "Signe et symbole," Revue Thomiste 44 (April 1938), pp. 299-300 and 569 570 JAMES BERNARD MURPHY What I wish to explore here is the question: To what extent does the semiotic of John Poinsot account for the meaning of linguistic signs? In one sense, we cannot expect such a fundamental and general theory of the action of signs to tell us much about language. Language is a surpassingly complex and, in many ways, a unique sign-system. Expecting a general theory of signs to capture the meaning of the linguistic sign is like expecting physics to explain reproductive biology. In another sense, though, we ought to expect his semiotic to illuminate that preeminent system of signs, human language. For in addition to "Le Langage et la theorie du signe," Anne.:re au chapitre II of Quatre essais sur!'esprit dans sa condition charnelle (Nouvelle edition revue et augmentee; Paris: Alsatia, 1956), pp. 113-124. This latter essay appears in a modestly amplified English version, " Language and the Theory of Sign," from Language : An Enquiry into Its Meaning and Function, edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 86-101; and, fully annotated in relation to Poinsot's Tractatus de Signis, it has been reprinted in Frontiers in Semiotics, edited by John Deely, Brooke Williams, and Felicia Kruse (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1986), pp. 51-62. Following Maritain, a number of authors have attempted to apply Poinsot's semiotic to contemporary debates. I note the principal ones in chronological order: John A. Oesterle, " Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning," The Thomist 7 (1944), pp. 233-263; John Wild, "An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Signs," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (December 1947), pp. 217-244; Henry B. Veatch, Intentional Logic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952). Poinsot's Treatise on Signs was originally published in 1632 as a small part of volume 2 in the original five volumes (Alcala, Spain: 1631-1635) of his philosophical writings. These five volumes have been published as three volumes under the title Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus in the modern edition by Beatus Reiser (Turin: Marietti, 1930, 1933, 1937). The first independent presentation of Poinsot's complete Tractatus de Signis was prepared by John Deely in consultation with Ralph A. Powell and published in bilingual critical edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). Since the publication of this edition of the Tractatus, two major critiques and reconstructions of Poinsot's analysis... (shrink)

In this book, Michael Murphy argues that if cosmopolitanism is to remain critical and relevant, what is required is a process of critique and cooperation. At the level of intercultural exchange, this requires understanding the encounter with the Other as a mutual phase of development and holds out the potential to rejuvenate world philosophies. Through this process the cosmopolitan imagination emerges from a dialogue between global traditions of relational sociologies on matters of common concern. The second stage of the (...) book applies this methodology to provide a radical account of being and acting in the world. This will be achieved through engaging in conversation with the works of the critical theorist, Gerard Delanty; the decolonial theorist, Walter Mignolo; and the Buddhist, Confucian, and phenomenological-inspired work of Watsuji Tetsurō. In providing a move away from abstractions and ideals to instead focus on injustices and everyday life, Murphy uncovers an independent source for political legitimacy not defined by the rationality of the state or dependent on the ideals of Western philosophy. Part of this investigation also reveals a post-individual account of agency as an enactive being. Emphasising agency as becoming has the potential to allow us to reimagine the relationship between the self and the institutions of democracy. The main themes of this book are eurocentrism, critical cosmopolitanism, post-individual subjectivity, and democracy--back cover. (shrink)

Some commentators speak freely about genetics being poised to change human nature. Contrary to such rhetoric, Norman Daniels believes no such thing is plausible since ‘nature’ describes characteristic traits of human beings as a whole. Genetic interventions that do their work one individual at a time are unlikely to change the traits of human beings as a class. Even so, one can speculate about ways in which human beings as a whole could be genetically altered, and there is nothing about (...) that venture that could not be deliberated in the way other high-impact questions can be evaluated. There might well come a time when it would be defensible to use genetics to change human beings as a class, in order to protect people in the face of changed environmental circumstances or to enhance existing capacities. Moreover, if one understands human nature not in an empirically descriptive way but in a metaphysical way having implications about human behavior, it can make sense to talk about de-naturing individuals through genetic changes. Even under a metaphysical conception of human nature, however, one can still imagine that people in the future might want to alter their traits in pursuit of another normative idea of a good and valuable life, and genetic modifications might function as a pathway to that change. (shrink)

Most disagreements about the proper place of philosophy in the theologyscience dialogue stem from disagreements about the nature of philosophy itself This essay traces some of the history of ideas about the nature of philosophy, and then proposes that in this post-analytic era philosophy can play both a constructive and critical role in the theology-science dialogue. The constructive role is well reflected in current literature, so this article explores the role of philosophy as therapy. As a test case the doctrine (...) of critical realism is diagnosed as a theory designed to solve a problem that needs instead to be dissolved by recognizing that it is based on a misleading picture of the knower's relation to the world. /// A autora do presente artigo parte do pressuposto de que a grande maioria dos desacordos acerca do lugar específico da Filosofia no contexto do diálogo entre Teologia e Ciência derivam de desacordos no que respeita à própria natureza da Filosofia. Nesse sentido, o artigo traça algumas das linhas de desenvolvimento na história das ideias relativamente à questão acerca da natureza da Filosofia, sugerindo que na presente era pós-analítica a Filosofia pode desempenhar um papel tão construtivo como crítico no âmbito do diálogo entre Teologia e Ciência. O papel construtivo está bem representado na literatura mais actual, o que leva a autora a explorar de um modo especial a pertinência e o alcance da noção de Filosofia como Terapia. O texto assume também como caso especial de verificação a doutrina do realismo crítico como exemplo de teoria desenhada para a solução de um problema e que, pelo contrário, necessita de ser dissolvida mediante o reconhecimento de que está baseada numa representação confusa acerca da relação do sujeito do conhecimento com o mundo. (shrink)

This essay tracks Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of the relationship between ontology and the practice of philosophy. More specifically, it aims to situate the later Merleau-Ponty’s conviction that philosophy would be reborn in a “return” to ontology alongside recent shifts in what we understand ontology to be and in the widely variable ways in which ontology is figured over the half-century since his death. Cet essai retrace la compréhension merleau-pontienne de la relation entre l’ontologie et la pratique de la philosophie. Plus spécifiquement, (...) il vise à situer la conviction du dernier Merleau-Ponty que la philosophie pourrait renaître d’un “retour” à l’ontologie, par rapport aux récents changements dans la compréhension de celle-ci, ainsi qu’aux manières très différentes dont elle a été conçue au cours d’un demi-siècle après sa mort. Questo articolo ripercorre la concezione merleau-pontiana della relazione tra ontologia e pratica della filosofia. In particolare, l’articolo mira a contestualizzare la convinzione, che ritroviamo nell’ultimo Merleau-Ponty, che la filosofia possa rinascere attraverso un “ritorno” all’ontologia, in riferimento ad alcune recenti oscillazioni nel modo in cui quest’ultima viene intesa e ai molteplici modi in cui essa è stata concepita nel corso dei cinquant’anni successivi alla sua morte. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay explores the phenomenology of hunger in reference to work by Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Simone de Beauvoir. Considering the wealth of references to hunger in phenomenological literature, very little has been written that acknowledges the importance of hunger in French existential phenomenology in particular. With reference to work by the above authors, this essay examines how hunger alters one’s basic experience of space and time, no less one’s sense of social belonging. Phenomenology illuminates dimensions of the human (...) experience of hunger that remain veiled in other discourses, and it is vital that efforts to understand hunger engage the profound narratives of disorientation, illness and shame that come to the fore in this body of work. (shrink)